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Introduction
Establishment of protected areas has for a long time been a core strategy 
in efforts to sustain the biological diversity and ecosystem functions of the 
world’s tropical forests. This often involves different degrees of human 
exclusion from resource use. However, as the pendulum in the global policy 
agenda has swung between a focus on conservation and a greater emphasis 
on poverty reduction and sustainable development, exclusionary approaches 
to conservation have become subject to increasing criticism regarding a 
lack of synergy between conservation and social development goals such 
as poverty reduction, economic growth and social equity (Brockington et 
al. 2006; West and Brockington 2006, Sunderland et al. 2008). Exclusionary 
forest conservation is still very much on the agenda globally, perhaps more 
so than ever, since the increasing resources being directed to forest-based 
climate change mitigation efforts are raising concern about their impacts 
on indigenous and local communities (e.g. Angelsen 2009). In this chapter, 
we contribute to the discussion on the social impacts of exclusionary forest 
conservation, drawing on a case study of the establishment of a forest 
corridor in north-eastern Tanzania.
In post-independence Tanzania, the evolution of forest management 
policies has largely followed the trends of global conservation and 
development agendas (see Woodcock 2002). Tanzania is among the nations 
with the largest coverage of protected areas and is home to sites of high 
biodiversity value (Newmark 2002:67; Brockington 2005:102). Nearly 40 
percent of the land area is protected at some level in Tanzania (WRI 2006). 
Since the 1990s, there has been a marked policy shift, supported by legal 
reforms, towards greater attention to and participation by local communities 
in forest management and conservation, while the expansion of a protected 
forest area network also remains a key strategy (cf. MNRT 2006). The 
international development aid and conservation communities have played a 
significant role in supporting, and undoubtedly influencing, the forest policy 
shifts in Tanzania (Woodcock 2002; Vihemäki 2009).      
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The East Usambara Mountains in north-eastern Tanzania represent a 
microcosm of the ecological, economic and social impacts of changing 
forest management objectives, policies, and donor interests. As a part of the 
Eastern Arc Mountains, the East Usambaras are considered one of the global 
biodiversity hotspots, hosting a high number of endemic species of plants 
and animals confined to the mountain forests (Rodgers and Homewood 1982; 
Burgess et al. 2007). The area is also home to people practising agriculture 
on the mountain slopes. A history of commercial logging and estate farming, 
and the expansion of smallholder agriculture, has created a mosaic of 
fragmented forest patches and agricultural land uses across the landscape. 
Expansion of farming and forest fragmentation are seen as threats to the 
endemic biodiversity and functioning of ecosystems (e.g. URT 2006). 
Finnish involvement in the East Usambaras began in the late 1970s in the 
form of assistance to the development of commercial logging and sawmilling 
industries. An outcry by the international conservation community ended 
the logging activities; and Finnish assistance in the East Usambaras was 
gradually geared towards biodiversity conservation (Mwalubandu et al. 
1991). The East Usambara Catchment Forest Project (EUCFP) 1990–1998, 
and its final phase, the East Usambara Conservation Area Management 
Programme (EUCAMP) 1999–2002, supported forest conservation in the East 
Usambaras for a total of around 7.6 million Euros (EUCFP 1995; EUCAMP 
2002). One of the achievements of these projects was the enforcement 
and expansion of a number of forest reserves and the establishment of 
Amani Nature Reserve. As complementary measures to the protected areas, 
participatory forest management and farm forestry were also promoted. 
To address the negative ecological effects of forest fragmentation, several 
conservation corridors were proposed to connect the largest forest blocks 
confined within the reserves (Newmark 1993; Tye 1993).   
The establishment of the Derema Corridor in the southern part of the 
East Usambaras was initiated during the last years of EUCAMP in order to 
reduce forest fragmentation. The local counterpart of EUCAMP, which was 
also the main organisation responsible for the management of the East 
Usambara mountain forests, was the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) 
of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). After the closure 
of  EUCAMP, the coordination of the Derema process was continued by 
MNRT and its World Bank funded Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management 
Project. The conservation approach chosen involved the displacement of 
hundreds of small-holder farmers from their farmland in the Corridor. Negative 
livelihood impacts were to be minimized through monetary compensation. 
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The establishment of the Derema Corridor provides many lessons 
learned for conservationists, donors, decision-makers and implementers 
contemplating similar conservation interventions. Primary among these 
lessons are those relating to the conditions for enhancing equity and the 
legitimacy of conservation decisions, processes and outcomes. In our 
account of the Derema conservation and displacement process, we assess 
the ways in which the intervention strived to legitimise the decisions and 
measures taken, and to involve the affected villagers. We demonstrate that 
the negotiations over the terms of conservation and compensation were not 
only conditioned by the shifting institutional framework which governed 
the process and the procedures adopted by the implementers, but also by 
other social structures and relations which affected the opportunities for 
effective and meaningful participation. Hence, our focus is on the agency 
of the affected people, meaning their actual ability to influence the process 
and its outcomes. 
 We draw here on empirical material gathered as part of two PhD research 
projects, one still on-going and the other recently completed. The data con-
sists of ethnographic material (interviews, observations, discussions) collect-
ed by the researchers between October 2003 and February 2010. The most 
important source of data that we rely on is semi-structured and structured 
individual and group interviews conducted with local people in two villages 
adjacent to the Corridor. In addition, to a lesser degree, we draw from two 
household surveys, conducted in 2005 and 2008. Previous research reports 
from the area, official legal documents, and grey literature were also used as 
research material and as a means of cross-checking some of the information.
In order to tie our analysis of the Derema process to the biophysical and 
historical context, we first briefly address the history of natural resource use, 
the livelihood strategies, and the economic and policy changes that have 
affected natural resource management in the area. We specifically highlight 
the role of Finnish forestry aid in the shift in forest management objectives 
and practices from exploitation to conservation in the East Usambaras. We 
then present the relevant institutional framework, providing a backdrop for 
the overview on the conservation and displacement process. The strategies 
of the affected people to claim, contest and defend access, as well as the 
limitations on their agency, are then analysed in order to come to a conclu-
sion on the factors that may affect the equity and legitimacy of compensa-
tion for displacement due to conservation. 
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Access and agency in displacement processes and outcomes
By ‘displacement’, we refer not only to the physical relocation of people 
or settlements, but have adopted a broader definition to include restricted 
access to production resources as well. Recognition of the impoverishment 
risks associated with economic displacement has led to the official adoption 
of this broader concept in, e.g., the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.12 on 
Resettlement (Cernea 2005). 
In our approach, the concepts of access to resources and agency are seen 
to be closely interwoven in the analysis of social changes triggered by dis-
placement. We assume that the actors, including groups of people, involved 
in a specific intervention can strategically use different resources, both sym-
bolic and material, to promote their interests. In this case, these interests are 
mainly related to access to both the natural resources from which people were 
excluded, and to the monetary compensation for the lost resources. In our 
conceptualization regarding access and how it is constituted and contested by 
actors, we draw on Ribot and Peluso (2003), who have developed a ‘theory 
of access’ to analyse “…who actually benefits from things […] and through 
what processes they are able to do so.” We suggest a more limited definition 
of access, confining it to the actual ability of the actors to benefit from the 
resources at stake, and excluding the means and processes enabling access. 
Map 1. Amani Nature Reserve in north-eastern Tanzania.
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Rights indicate different types of socially acknowledged claims to 
resources, and form a sub-category of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
Rights authorise their holder to use, manage and benefit from resources, but 
only when there is a statutory or customary social mechanism that allocates 
duties and binds individuals to them (Bromley 1991). The legal, or institutional, 
framework thus conditions access through defining rights. An important 
observation is that claims based on national legislation on the one hand, 
and on customary law on the other, may often be conflicting, or socially 
recognised to different degrees by different actors (Colchester 2008). Differing 
interpretations of rights to resources and compensation entail the threat of 
ignoring or further marginalising individuals or groups that do not possess a 
‘voice’ to claim or defend their rights in displacement processes. 
Hence, in addition to rights, it is important to analyse the means or strategies 
of claiming and defending access to given resources. These include, for 
instance, discursive means, existing social networks, and sometimes more 
hidden ways of action as well, such as non-cooperation (cf. Ribot and Peluso 
2003). The means to which actors resort in negotiations or struggles over 
access are largely determined by their existing resource base. Ribot and 
Peluso (2003) also recognise structural and relational mechanisms conditioning 
access, such as technology, capital, markets, knowledge, authority, social 
identities, and social relations, which can constitute power over other actors. 
A central reservation in our study is that social actors participating in 
or deemed to ‘benefit’ from a given project tend to differ in the material 
and symbolic resources they have to do so. The outcomes for different 
actors in a conservation intervention are always conditioned by the 
structures and relations not only between rural communities and external 
actors, but also within the affected communities (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999). Nevertheless, interventions seeking to involve local communities in 
conservation frequently lump together all the actors in a ‘community’ as a 
single stakeholder, overlooking the various competing interests within the 
communities that may be at stake (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Ribot 2003). 
Those seeking ‘community consent’ to an intervention may also choose 
to only inform the official or political representatives of communities, or 
members that they usually or conveniently work with, begging the question 
of the representativeness and legitimacy of such consent (Freeman et al. 
2008). 
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Study area: History of resource use and livelihoods in Derema
Human-induced forest change has long historical roots in the Usambaras, 
dating to the pre-colonial era (e.g. Hamilton 1989; Conte 2004), although 
it has varied in intensity and scope. The customary land and forest 
tenure system of the Shambaa, the historically dominant ethnic group in the 
Usambara Mountains (Feierman 1974), was based on loose community 
tenure. It began to erode at the start of the colonial era at the end of the 19th 
century (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989a, Woodcock 2002). Since then, land 
use in the East Usambara Mountains has been characterised by intensified 
forest and land utilisation. 
Under German colonial rule, land was divided into forest reserves, 
private estates, and public land for the local people (Hamilton and Mwasha 
1989a). Sawmills were established in different locations in the mountains, 
including one located in Derema (Schabel 1990). From the late 1940s, forest 
clearing expanded in the East Usambara Mountains with the emergence of 
new profit-oriented actors. The Sikh Sawmills bought several tea estates in 
the East Usambaras, focusing on producing timber rather than tea (Iversen 
1991:14; Conte 2004:156). Migration from other parts of Tanzania into the 
area was fuelled by work opportunities in the tea and sawmilling industries. 
This also contributed to agricultural expansion, as many migrants settled 
in nearby villages, partially clearing forests for cardamom cultivation under 
the rainforest canopy. Cardamom was first introduced to the area by the 
Germans and gradually adopted by small-scale farmers as a profitable cash 
crop (Vihemäki 2009). The Derema area was assessed as almost completely 
under cultivation of cardamom and subsistence crops by the 1990s (Iversen 
1991:64; Johansson and Sandy 1996). At the same time, it was also consi-
dered the largest tract of unprotected forest in the East Usambaras (e.g. 
Newmark 1993; Newmark 2002; FBD et al. 2004). 
The Derema area included land belonging to five villages: Kisiwani, IBC 
Msasa, Kwezitu, Kwemdimu and Kambai (URT 2006). The field work for this 
study was conducted in IBC Msasa and Kwezitu, where many of the appro-
priated farms were located. Most of our work was focused on the hamlets 
of Makanya and Kwekuyu in IBC Msasa, and Antakae of Kwezitu, places 
in which a large number of inhabitants had lost farms to the Corridor, 
according to local key informants. 
The majority of the people in the study villages identify themselves as 
belonging to the Shambaa ethnic group. A relatively high proportion of 
migrants in the population is a general feature of the study villages nowa-
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days. A survey conducted in 2000 estimated that approximately 44 percent 
of the inhabitants of the area were immigrants (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000), 
although many of them had come from nearby villages. 
As in other areas of the 
East Usambara Mountains, 
most of the people in IBC 
Msasa and Kwezitu de-
pend on small-scale farm-
ing. Cash crops typically 
include cardamom and 
other spice crops, such as 
cloves and cinnamon and, 
increasingly, sugarcane. 
Subsistence crops such as 
yams are typically inter-
cropped in the spice agro-
forestry systems; whereas 
maize and beans are cultivated in more open spaces. Other main sources of 
livelihood include small businesses and working on the tea estates. Some 
people have also benefited from development and conservation activities 
introduced in past years, such as butterfly farming and trading of the 
seeds of an indigenous tree species, Allanblackia stuhlmannii. For many 
people in the study villages, the Derema Corridor was an important source 
of income and food. Moreover, firewood, timber, building poles and ropes, 
bushmeat, and medicinal plants were also obtained from the area.
Finnish aid in the East Usambaras
The Finnish development cooperation in the East Usambaras started with 
technical assistance and financial support for commercial forestry in the 
1970s. Finland supported the operations of the Sikh Saw Mills, by then 
nationalised, logging timber in the East Usambaras and processing them in 
the regional capital of Tanga. One of the main products of the company 
was crates for exporting tea (Mustonen and Räsänen 1985). A valuable indi- 
genous tree species, Cephalosphaera usambarensis, was mainly used for this 
purpose. In addition to being highly extractive, logging led to environmental 
problems such as soil erosion and deterioration of roads and water sources. 
The forestry operations came under increasingly heavy criticism both locally 
and internationally, finally leading to the cessation in 1986 of Sikh Saw Mills 
Picture 1. Village landscape in IBC Msasa village  
close to Derema Corridor in Tanzania.
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operations in the uplands of the East Usambaras (Mwalubandu et al. 1991; 
Hamilton and Mwasha 1989b). 
During the 1980s, the focus of Finnish development cooperation gradually 
shifted from utilisation of the forests to conservation. The East Usambara 
Catchment Forest Project (EUCFP), Phases I (1990–1994) and II (1995–1998) 
were designed to assist the Tanzanian government in sustainably mana-ging 
and protecting the environmental and biodiversity values of the mountain 
forests. In its last phase in 1999–2002, EUCFP and the IUCN-led East 
Usambara Conservation and Agricultural Development Project (EUCADEP) 
merged as the East Usambara Conservation Area Management Programme 
(EUCAMP). EUCAMP received around 2.4 million Euros from the Finnish 
government, in addition to a 1.4 million Euro contribution by the EU and 
over 300,000 Euros from the Tanzanian government (EUCAMP 2002). 
EUCAMP continued the core activities of EUCFP of forest conservation in 
protected reserves and biological research, in addition to providing support 
for community participation, a concept that had started to gain importance 
in the 1990s, through promotion of pilot activities in community forestry and 
agroforestry (EUCAMP 2002; Vihemäki 2009). 
The association of forest management and Finland, or FINNIDA, as the 
government branch of Finnish development aid was formerly called, is still 
strong in many villages. In the same way as the 1980s project EUCADEP is 
simply referred to as “IUCN”, the Amani Nature Reserve and the Derema 
Corridor are often called “FINNIDA”. This illustrates the way conservation 
interventions are commonly associated with the external agencies involved, 
despite outwardly local or government ownership. The bad name gained 
by FINNIDA among the local population in the 1970s for forest destruction 
(cf. Mwalubandu et al. 1991) was still recalled in a village meeting in April 
2009 where it was asked why the villagers, now challenged to take ownership 
of sustainable resource management, should “clean up the mess” i.e., the 
forest destruction caused by external actors thirty years ago. The Finnish 
nationality of the authors of this study also caused some suspicion at the 
beginning of our research. On one of our first visits to IBC Msasa in April 
2008, a local farmer remarked “so, you have come to check your property”, 
referring to the Corridor.
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Institutional framework of conservation  
and displacement in Derema
At the start of the conservation process, Derema was primarily perceived 
as unreserved public land although much of it was under cultivation in a 
customary tenure system. Contradictory accounts of the status of land tenure 
in Derema have been presented; apparently the situation was not clear to 
EUCAMP at the start of the Corridor intervention (Vihemäki 2009). Despite 
lacking official documentation of occupancy, local farmers considered them-
selves owners of their farms in the planned corridor (Jambiya and Sosovele 
2000). Individual parcels of land were and still are bought and sold, inheri- 
ted, leased and borrowed under the concept of private ownership. 
The legal framework for the establishment of the Derema Corridor was 
defined by the Land Act (1999) and Village Land Act (1999). This legislation 
was part of the Tanzanian land law reforms of the late 1990s, which aimed at 
improving the security of customary land access. Derema was thus classified 
as village land (URT 2006:14-15), a type of legal land category meaning the 
area managed by the village council (village government) within the village 
boundaries. On village land, customary land rights are protected by the law 
as private land rights. Nevertheless, as a colonial legacy, all land (soil) in 
Tanzania remains under the ownership of the Head of the State as a trustee 
on behalf of the citizens. Village land can be transferred for public benefit to 
the category of ‘reserved land’ upon the decision of the President (through 
the Minister of Lands). 
The Village Land Act defines the procedures for informing, consulting 
with, obtaining consent from, and paying compensation to local communities 
in cases of transferring land out of their domain, all of which were 
applicable to the Derema case. The Village Council, upon receiving the 
notice, is to inform all villagers, giving them at least 90 days to respond, 
and assist all those who may be affected. The Commissioner of Lands must 
attend a meeting of the Village Council or a Village Assembly (a public meeting 
open to all villagers above 18 years of age) to explain why the land is to be 
transferred and to answer any questions. Holders of rights to the land to be 
transferred, including holders of customary rights, whether registered or not 
(Village Land Regulations 2001), are entitled to compensation. The Village 
Land Regulations (2001, 8-10) define the compensation to be paid for the 
land itself together with improvements, as determined by the current open 
market value, or an assessment of lost income, or by replacement cost. In 
addition, compensation must be paid not only for the property of individual 
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occupants, but also for communal land within the village (Regulation 8a). 
The terms of the compensation, i.e., type, amount and timing, need to 
be mutually agreed upon before the transfer can take place. The Village 
Assembly has the power to approve or reject removal of under 250 ha of 
land from the village domain. The land law thus stipulates that there is a 
consultation and a negotiation component in the process, and assigns the 
community the right to give or withhold consent to the land transfer, but 
strictly limits this right by making it applicable only to areas smaller than 
250 ha. 
In addition to land laws, the establishment of protected forest areas is 
also governed by forest legislation. The Tanzanian National Forest Policy 
of 1998 (URT 1998) paved the way for a policy shift towards scaling up 
participatory processes in forest management nationwide; Participatory 
Forest Management was written into the law in the Forest Act of 2002. 
The implications of customary forest rights in the establishment of forest 
protected areas are defined in the 2002 Forest Act. Any objections, petitions, 
comments and presentations made by the communities should be recorded; 
and all claims of customary rights investigated. If such customary rights are 
proven to exist, different alternatives should be considered. These include: 
modification of the conservation plan so that these rights can continue to be 
exercised; conserving the area through community-based forest management, 
or continuing with the strict conservation plan, considering its high national 
or international importance. Holders of rights to the forest areas to be 
conserved are entitled to “full and fair compensation” for the reallocation 
of their rights. The 2002 Forest Act also defines redress mechanisms (2002, 
Sections 23-24). Despite the elaborate consultative processes outlined, the 
Forest Act does not assign affected communities either the right to consent 
to, or conversely, the right to veto conservation plans. 
Despite Finland’s adherence to OECD guidelines on resettlement and 
compensation, the Tanzanian laws were applied by EUCAMP in Derema, 
instead of any international standards for compensation (URT 2006:8). At a 
later stage, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) sought financial assistance 
from the World Bank and thereafter agreed to follow the World Bank 
Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on resettlement. Should any differences 
between the Tanzanian procedures and the OP 4.12 occur, the “stricter of 
the two” was to be followed (URT 2006:17). 
The OP 4.12 covers impacts caused by “the involuntary restriction of 
access to legally designated parks and protected areas resulting in adverse 
impacts on the livelihoods of the displaced persons” (World Bank OP 4.12, 
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Section 3(c)). It has requirements that go beyond the Tanzanian law, including 
informing displaced people about their options and rights pertaining to 
resettlement, and advising on and offering choices among resettlement 
alternatives. In cases of restricted access to parks and protected areas, the 
OP 4.12 is specific about the requirement for a plan that describes the 
participatory means by which the project is to be prepared and implemented, 
the criteria for determining eligibility of displaced persons, the measures to 
assist the displaced persons in their efforts to improve or at least to restore 
their livelihoods, and monitoring of the entire process. The OP stresses that 
there should be a timely information flow to and from the affected parties, 
and provision of prompt and effective compensation at full replacement 
cost for loss of assets. It calls for special attention to protect the needs 
of vulnerable groups among the displaced, such as women, children, and 
the poorest people. Furthermore, the compensation to displaced persons 
whose livelihoods are land-based should be land-based. The combination 
of productive potential, advantages of the new geographical location, and 
other factors describing the new land should show that the new land is at 
least equivalent to the land taken (World Bank OP 4.12, Section 11).  
Establishment of the Derema Corridor 
The Derema area was first considered for a forest reserve in 1974, but the 
plan was abandoned due to financial constraints. Inventories in the 1980s 
deemed that the area had been almost entirely “destroyed” under cultivation 
and was not worth preserving (Iversen 1991:64). In the early 1990s, in 
connection with the EUCFP a new plan was made for a 790 ha corridor in 
Derema to connect the Amani Nature Reserve in the southern part of the 
East Usambara Mountains with other reserves in the north (Tye 1993; 
Johansson and Sandy 1996). The process for the establishment of the 
Corridor was initiated as part of the work plan of EUCFP/EUCAMP 1999–
2000 (EUCFP 1999). The main events in the process are summarised in Table 1. 
Village meetings were planned in IBC Msasa, Kambai, Kwezitu and 
Kisiwani “to reach agreement on gazetting the proposed Derema forest 
reserve” (EUCFP 1999), but a social impact assessment (SIA) carried out in 
2000 is documented as the first step taken (EUCAMP 2002: 33). The SIA was 
undertaken to provide data for the forest reserve planners on the potential 
positive and negative social impacts of the exercise (Jambiya and Sosovele 
2000), but it also served to inform local people about the planned Corridor 
(Vihemäki 2009). 
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The Corridor plan initially met with opposition in the surrounding villages. 
A common line of thinking among the villagers was a rather open rejection 
of the appropriation of their land, although they were informed that they 
would receive monetary compensation for lost access and income (Jambiya 
and Sosovele 2000). Some of the farmers had previously lost farmland in the 
establishment of the Amani Nature Reserve, and many of them had been 
dissatisfied with the level of compensation received (Jambiya and Sosovele 
2001; Vihemäki 2005, 2009). Resentment related to this previous experience 
partly explains the animosity with which the SIA team was met in some 
villages (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000).
Table 1. Main events in the establishment of the Derema Corridor. 
1974 Derema first considered as a Forest Reserve.
early 1990s East Usambara Catchment Forest Project starts. Derema again proposed as a Forest Reserve 
and later as a Wildlife Corridor.
1999 Gazetting of Derema Corridor included in the work plan of the last phase of EUCFP/EUCAMP 
(1999–2002).
July 2000 Social Impact Assessment (SIA) carried out in the five villages to be affected by the Corridor.
November 2000 Stakeholders’ workshop on SIA results conducted in Muheza town.
March-June 2001 Boundary survey and demarcation, including slashing of crops along the boundary.
July 2001 Mid-term review of EUCAMP recommends an alternative, community-based conservation 
approach.
August 2001 Another stakeholders’ workshop in Muheza decides to go ahead with the protected area ap-
proach; confirmed by the EUCAMP Steering Committee.
March 2002 Compensation payments for boundary crops to 172 farmers.
May-June 2002 Valuation of crops inside the corridor.
December 2002 EUCAMP closure. Compensation still pending.
2004 World Bank (WB) support sought, field mission.
2005 Part of remaining compensation paid to farmers.
2006 Derema Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) prepared for WB.
February-May 2008 Final compensation paid to farmers with WB funding.
January 2010 RAP implementation ends. Farmers yet to receive substitute farmland.
Sources: Iversen 1991; Tye 1993; EUCAMP 1999, 2000; Jambiya and Sosovele 2000; Sjöholm et al. 2001;  
Pohjonen 2002; URT 2006; authors’ field work.
Despite the resistance, the SIA reported that most people had “a clear 
understanding” of the ecological justification of the conservation exercise, 
although this might have been related to years of environmental education 
by the various projects in the villages rather than a concern over forest frag-
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mentation per se. The SIA survey also suggested that about 13 percent were 
willing to shift their farming activities to other areas and supported conser-
vation as “a good thing for the future generations” (Jambiya and Sosovele 
2000:25). A small group did not comprehend the whole thing. A feeling of 
resignation was also reported to be common: “…if this is the government 
decision, what else can we do?” (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:25). The con-
trasting responses reflect the diversity of interests and discourses among the 
villagers, some of whom had been more involved in the conservation and 
development projects and thus more likely than others to have been ex-
posed to the ‘modern’ conservation discourse (cf. Vihemäki 2009).
Interestingly, in a workshop organised after the SIA was completed to 
share the findings with all the stakeholders and make recommendations on 
how best to proceed (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:56), the villagers’ position 
had shifted, at least in the official arena of negotiations in which their rep-
resentatives participated. The SIA report of the workshop gives the impres-
sion that the villagers’ representatives in the workshop were by and large 
positive about the conservation plan, and the general conclusion was that 
the Derema area must become a reserve (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:65-
66). However, only 24 villagers represented the thousands of people in the 
five affected villages (estimated 7878 in 2006, URT 2006). These 24 included 
the village and hamlet chairpersons, along with a handful of other villagers. 
Only one of them was a woman (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 4; 
hamlet chairperson, October 2003, Makanya). The level of consensus within 
the villages could have been lower than suggested by the workshop declara-
tions. According to the results of the household survey conducted in Makan-
ya and Antakae hamlets in 2008, 54% of the male respondents (n=46) and 
only 12% of the female respondents (n=42) who had lost access to land in 
the Derema process felt that they had participated in the decision about the 
Corridor. The lone female representative in the post-SIA workshop echoed 
the general concern of women documented in the SIA survey that specific 
measures would need to be taken to ensure that men alone would not col-
lect the compensation money and use it for purposes other than the benefit 
of their families (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 4). 
Regarding the conservation approach for Derema, a strictly protected 
government reserve appears to have been the dominant idea throughout 
the process. During the planning of the final phase of EUCAMP, the options 
suggested were either to conserve the area as a government forest reserve, 
or to create a series of community-managed village forest reserves. The 
decision was to be made after consulting the villagers (EUCAMP 1998:21). 
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Nevertheless, one of the EUCAMP advisors later stated that the original plan 
was to make the Corridor a “normal forest reserve” (pers. comm., May 2007), 
probably meaning a government forest reserve. Whereas the EUCAMP 
representatives and government officials stressed the integration of local 
people in the planning (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 2; Vihemäki 
2009), the SIA was focused on the protected area approach and did not 
explore other alternatives (Sjöholm et al. 2001). 
The mid-term review of EUCAMP in 2001 criticised the programme for 
sustaining an exclusionary approach to forest conservation and not conside-
ring local people’s rights. The review warned about the risk of conflict. 
It recommended that conservation of the Derema area should be through 
community-based forest management instead (Sjöholm et al. 2001; Pohjo-
nen 2002). At this point, the boundary marking of the Corridor was already 
underway (Sjöholm et al. 2001). A “Derema villagers’ workshop on the 
selection of the management approach for the Corridor” was subsequently 
organised in Muheza town. The report on this workshop stated that the 
participants preferred the establishment of a government forest reserve in 
Derema over conservation through village forest reserves (Pohjonen 2002). 
The EUCAMP Steering Committee subsequently decided to continue the 
establishment of the Corridor as a government reserve (Pohjonen 2002). The 
Steering Committee reserved the option to involve the communities in forest 
management at a later date, through Joint Forest Management agreements 
(FBD et al. 2004).    
A report by the GoT’s Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD), and other 
organisations involved (FBD et al. 2004), suggests that conservation through 
village forest reserves was not accepted by the ‘communities’ because they 
believed that it would be impossible to combine cultivation with conserva-
tion. According to an FBD official who had been involved in the process 
(interview, Dar es Salaam, 4 January 2008), the community-based manage-
ment approach was rejected because under this plan the farmers would not 
have received any compensation. He also cited doubts about the villagers’ 
capacities to control illegal activities in the forest. The same risk was also 
mentioned by some villagers in later discussions as a reason to support the 
idea of making Derema a government reserve. At the same time, these vil-
lagers also maintained that only a minority of the villagers had supported the 
exclusionary approach, but that this minority “had given better reasons” or 
justified their position better in village assemblies, leading to the ‘community 
consent’ of the protected area (group interview, Makanya, May 2008).   
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Only farms were included in the proposed reserve plan, boundaries be-
ing designed to exclude settlements and homes to avoid costly relocation 
(URT 2006). The boundary demarcation in mid-2001 involved slashing the 
crops along a 3-metre wide, 27 km long boundary surrounding a 956 ha 
corridor (EUCAMP 2002; Pohjonen 2002). The slashed crops were recorded 
together with the farmer’s photograph. An estimate of the applicable com-
pensation was not available until months later (Pohjonen 2002). 
Subsequent developments imply that the consent within the villages in 
regard to the Corridor establishment was not as broad as the reports pre-
pared to complete the process suggested. At the time of the boundary sur-
vey, some farmers refused to cooperate with the demarcation, since they 
perceived the location of the marked boundary as different from the loca-
tion that had been agreed upon (Sjöholm et al. 2001:54; authors’ field data 
2005, 2008). The situation became tense, the police intervened, and some 
people were arrested in IBC Msasa (interview with Village Environmental 
Committee Chairman, IBC Msasa, March 2005; group interview with women, 
Makanya, May 2008). The issue was later resolved at a meeting of the village 
leaders, EUCAMP representatives and a local Member of Parliament (Pohjo-
nen 2002). An agreement was reached to move the boundary in two places 
(Sjöholm et al. 2001), and the demarcation was completed (Pohjonen 2002). 
Since the early stages of the process of creating the Derema Corridor, the 
affected farmers had been concerned about the rates of compensation and 
the schedule for payments, of which they had little knowledge (Sjöholm 
et al. 2001, authors’ data). The compensation to be paid, and the funds 
reserved by EUCAMP for that purpose, had first been calculated in 1998 ac-
cording to the old land law. The project was advised early on to adhere to 
the new land law, but an important departure from both the new Village 
Land Regulations and the World Bank OP 4.12 was maintained until the 
end of the compensation process; that is, compensation was only paid for 
lost annual income per crop. Although in 2001 the overall cost of Derema 
compensation was foreseen to consist of “the boundary crop valuation, the 
final crop valuation, determination of the land value as well as the value of 
other possible land rights” (Pohjonen 2002), no compensation was paid for 
the lost farm land itself or for communal land. In the first document clarify-
ing the process, which was prepared for the World Bank, compensation was 
stated as not being for the land itself since the area “is not gazetted as vil-
lage land and hence technically belongs to the state” (Derema World Bank, 
ND, 3). Yet in the Derema Resettlement Action Plan (URT 2006), prepared 
by GoT when applying for World Bank funding in 2006, the Corridor area 
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was defined as village land which would therefore be dealt with within the 
legal framework of the Village Land Act. Despite the requirements of the OP 
4.12 which were applicable to the Resettlement Action Plan, the basis for the 
compensation calculation remained the same until the end, compensation 
being paid for lost crop income but not for the land itself. 
How the terms and form of compensation were negotiated between the 
parties has not been well documented. The law does not require, for exam-
ple, the compensation to be monetary. Some interviewees stated that they 
had agreed to give up their land after they had been promised payment 
within six months (IBC Msasa, October 2003; URT 2006:20). This was prob-
ably related to the land law clause on interest to be added to the compen-
sation upon failure of payment within six months. Even though the official 
reports and documents on the Derema process repeatedly refer to “consul-
tations of the local stakeholders all along the way” (URT 2006:28) on “what 
alternatives [the villagers] would accept” (Derema World Bank, ND, 3), few 
events have been documented. Those that have been documented include 
the SIA, and the two workshops in which a few representatives of the villag-
ers participated. Some meetings at village level were also held in mid-2004 
in preparation for the World Bank involvement in funding the process.  
A change to the compensation procedure mandated by the new legal 
framework that was implemented was using the farmers’ own estimations 
of yields as the basis for compensation, instead of a periodically updated 
government crop value schedule (URT 2006). Compensation for the slashed 
boundary crops was paid in March 2002 at highly profitable rates per plant 
(Ths 28,800; approx. US $22 in 2009), based on the farmers’ estimations of 
cardamom yield. This was many times higher than the normal yield in simi-
lar conditions (Dr. T. Reyes, Pers. Comm., December 2007). Later seen by 
its implementers as a decisive complication to the process, the sum to be 
paid to the farmers increased 12-fold following the change in the calculation 
method (URT 2006). It also raised expectations among farmers about high 
compensation for the remaining crops. 
In mid-2002, the crops within the Corridor were valued. Teams formed by 
a crop value consultant, Muheza district agricultural officers, forest officers 
and research assistants visited each farm in the Corridor, counting crops and 
recording their stage of maturity. People were called to their farms, photo-
graphed and requested to sign a form on which their crops were recorded. 
No other data concerning the people who showed up except their names 
were recorded (URT 2006:18-19). The farmers later described a two-step 
procedure in which they signed the crop form at the village office following 
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the farm visit, but it was not always the same person who represented the 
family on the two occasions. A government representative who had been su-
pervising the process equated the signing of the crop forms to an agreement 
by the farmers with the valuation (informal discussion with an FBD official, 
Dar es Salaam, February 2010). Agreements were probably also fuelled by 
expectations of profitable compensation. During the valuation, the number 
of farms in the Corridor increased from the estimated 648 during boundary 
marking to 1547. Rapid new plantings and a higher number of farms were 
observed in the villages that were counted later (URT 2006:18-19). 
In 2002, EUCAMP closed without sufficient funds to complete the com-
pensation payments. The government of Tanzania was left to collect bits 
and pieces of conservation funding from various international conserva-
tion organisations and development partners to finalize the process. In 
the final report submitted on completion of the programme, the EUCAMP 
advisors pleaded for additional assistance to finalise the compensation process, 
stating that failure to pay compensation would “not only result in… the 
loss of investment, but also in conflicts within and between local communi-
ties, policy makers and the conservation institutions in the Tanga region” 
(EUCAMP 2002:46). 
In 2004, the MNRT approached the Tanzania Forest Conservation and 
Management Programme, funded by the World Bank, to request financial 
aid in order to complete the Derema Corridor compensation (URT 2006:11). 
In the meantime, half of the compensation was paid to each farmer in 2005, 
in anticipation of the coming presidential elections (URT 2006:11). The final 
compensation payments were paid out with World Bank funding during the 
period of the authors’ field work in February-May 2008. 
Some of the recommendations of the SIA – if not all of its findings – 
were taken into account in the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), especially 
regarding the planning of the WWF-mediated ‘resettlement’ project. In 2001, 
with the agreement of the District Commissioner, alternative farmland on 
former sisal estates in the lowlands was made available for those wishing to 
relocate. But even though some farmers from the affected Derema villages 
signed up, the land was not explicitly intended for the displaced farmers 
(URT 2006:24). The plans to facilitate new three-acre plots for the affected 
farmers on the sisal estates only became part of the ‘resettlement’ process 
during the implementation of the RAP in 2008–2009. A RAP component for 
creating alternative income generating activities, such as keeping dairy cat-
tle, beekeeping, butterfly farming and cultivating fish in ponds, was also sug-
gested to help those worst affected, i.e., those who lost land and received 
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very little compensation (Dr. G. Jambiya, pers. comm., January 2008). In ad-
dition, interest was added to the final compensation sums to compensate for 
the inflation which occurred during the delays in the process (URT 2006).  
Villagers’ strategies and limits to their agency
Although contacts and the flow of information between the government and 
the Derema farmers regarding plans to complete the conservation interven-
tion were irregular after the closure of EUCAMP, communication continued 
with the involvement of new actors. In mid-2004, representatives of the 
World Bank supervision mission to the Tanzania Forest Conservation and 
Management Programme, together with representatives of donor and con-
servation organisations, visited Derema and discussed with some villagers 
the prospects of completing the conservation and compensation process 
(Derema World Bank ND; interview with an FBD official, Tanga, Decem-
ber 2004). An official of the FBD explained the strategy used to convince 
the farmers to continue waiting for their compensation (interview, Tanga, 
December 2004): “We told them that as long you do not go there, we will 
be motivated to look for the money.” The completion of the compensation 
was thus made conditional upon continued restraint from active farming in 
the Corridor, while at the same time there was a large degree of uncertainty 
about the future of the intervention.
Increasing frustration was reflected in the discourse of the people affected 
while the compensation process dragged on. They repeatedly requested to 
be either paid the compensation or be given their old farms back. Many of 
the people affected were concerned about the government’s willingness and 
ability to complete the compensation payments. 
There were also threats – perhaps strategic ones aimed at influencing the 
process through the researchers – that young farmers would go and slash 
regenerating vegetation on their former farms if the money was not paid 
soon. Several people claimed that the failure to receive compensation had 
impoverished them because the income from their cardamom harvests had 
collapsed. They were not allowed to plant new crops on the forest farms 
and were not actively tending crops any more, but they did not have the 
money to start farming elsewhere (group interviews, IBC Msasa, 2003, 2008). 
Such comments also imply discursive resistance to the way the conservation 
and compensation intervention was being conducted.
Rumours were also abundant and persistent. For instance, women from 
Makanya village argued in several group interviews (October 2003, May 
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2008) that wild animals would be brought into the Derema forest following 
gazetting, stirring up fear about future crop losses in surrounding areas and 
dangers for children on the way to school and for women collecting fire-
wood. The speculation about wildlife being introduced had already been 
discussed in the post-SIA workshop (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000), where the 
project representative had denied such a plan. This repeated claim probably 
reflected the articulation of a general fear of how the intervention reduced 
local people’s control over their surroundings, or was used as a discursive 
effect to underline the respondents’ powerless, victimised position. 
The Derema conservation intervention gradually led to the affected villa-
gers’ mobilisation as they tried to exert pressure on various agencies. By late 
2003, the farmers had already sent delegations to district and regional level 
authorities to request information about the compensation process (e.g. 
Village Environmental Committee group interview, IBC Msasa, October 
2003). The farmers also made several visits to the District Commissioner, the 
Regional Commissioner of Tanga, and the Catchment Forest Office of FBD 
in Tanga in the subsequent years. 
By May 2005, affected people from the five villages had organised them-
selves into a ‘follow up committee’ which had sent a delegation three or four 
times to the office of the Regional Commissioner. The committee members 
considered this action not only as a means of trying to acquire information 
but also as a way of putting pressure on decision-makers and officials to 
speed up the process. Nonetheless, they only received partial information 
and were asked to come back later to consult other officials, which un-
dermined their efforts. In addition, the ‘locus’ of authority – who had the 
information and the power to decide about the compensation payments 
– was not clear to them. The committee members contributed their time 
and money, their own as well as support collected from other villagers for 
the costs of the trips, which made follow-up costly for them. By September 
2009, members of the committee who were interviewed explained 
the cessation of follow-up activities as being due to exhaustion and running 
out of financial support, although they still did not consider the process to 
be over.    
In their efforts to access information and ultimately obtain compensation, 
the farmers affected not only approached those authorities who were offi-
cially involved but also others whom they thought capable of dealing with 
the issue, or with whom they had had previous contacts. For instance, a dele- 
gation was sent to meet with the Regional Commissioner of Dar es Salaam 
(meeting of the affected farmers’ committee, April 2005). In their attempts to 
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speed up the compensation process, villagers thus tried to use their existing 
social networks in addition to the formal channels.  
The uneven distribution of resources among the local people, including 
material resources and social position, was reflected in who became more 
involved in the follow-up. Those who participated in meetings and repre- 
sented others had usually had previous contacts with government 
authorities, or the experience and resources to commit to the task. Many of 
them were older, more affluent, educated men. The members of the Village 
Environmental Committee and Village Council members, and other people 
with experience in representing others, were also among the most active 
local people. Perhaps reflecting their respected social position, the survey of 
2008 revealed that the follow-up committee was highly trusted by most of 
the affected respondents, although many of them, especially women, were 
not fully cognisant of the committee’s mission or tasks. Despite this general 
trust, some respondents in the 2008 survey expressed doubts about the 
capacity of the follow-up committee to influence the process. It was also 
asked whether they were accountable to the villagers or to “higher levels”. 
This reflects the complexity of the task of the members of the committee 
who, as messengers and self-appointed negotiators between the affected 
villagers and the authorities, were often forced to return home without news 
of the compensation, or with only vague promises of progress. 
At the same time, the representatives of the villagers were in a position 
to filter the information flow between the affected people and conservation 
officials, and to influence the negotiations according to their own interests. 
For instance, in the later stages of the process in 2008, a member of the follow-
up committee who was also the leader of a local dairy farmers’ network, 
encouraged affected farmers to participate in a cattle keeping training 
course for a fee, and to construct animal shelters, based on a vague plan by 
the RAP project to potentially provide cows for the poorest, most affected 
farmers. The latter then felt betrayed “yet again” when the plan did not 
materialize. 
Negotiations over the conditions of compensation and the follow-up 
process turned out to be largely a men’s affair. Nearly all women interviewed 
categorically considered that their voices were not heard or adequately 
taken into account in the displacement and compensation process. In gene-
ral, women’s information channels differed from those of men. According 
to the results of the household survey carried out in 2008, sixty percent of 
the male respondents (n=63) had found out about the Corridor plan at a 
village assembly, whereas only onethird of the female respondents (n=75) 
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had heard about it this way. Most women had heard the news through family, 
neighbours and other villagers. Women’s participation in village meetings is 
limited by chores such as farming, taking care of children and domestic ani-
mals, cooking, and fetching water and firewood, especially in places such as 
Makanya hamlet, located far from the village centre, where most meetings 
take place. It is also not uncommon that women are directly discouraged 
from public participation by their husbands. Most, if not all, of the village 
leaders who participated in the public consultations regarding the Corridor 
were men, as were the follow-up committee members. Their views on, for 
instance, suitable forms and methods of compensation are likely to have 
been different from those of women, and could have influenced the way the 
payments were ultimately made. Pohjonen (2002) reports that ‘farmers’ pre-
ferred personal cheques instead of payments to family accounts in the bank. 
Nevertheless, women tried to use the channels available to them to voice 
their concerns over the social effects of the displacement and the compensa-
tion method. They tried to make their voices heard especially through the 
interviews carried out at various points of the process, the SIA, the post-SIA 
workshop (SIA 2000, Appendix 2), and the authors’ interviews and surveys 
in 2005 and 2008. For example, women requested that portions of the com-
pensation for family farms should be paid separately to husband and wife 
(SIA 2000, Appendix 2). Despite the early documentation of these concerns, 
they were not effectively taken into account in the process. 
Lack of access to information was thus a key constraint on the villagers’ 
efforts to influence the process and its outcomes. At the same time, the 
perceived ‘secrecy’ and gaps in information flow left room for differing 
interpretations of the process, and served as a reason for continuing to contest 
the outcomes even after the finalization of the compensation payments. The 
villagers’ arguments also changed as their understanding of the process 
grew and their perceptions of their rights changed. In 2009, a new issue, 
the question of why compensation had not been paid for the land itself in 
addition to the crops, became central to the villagers’ discourse. A member of 
the follow-up committee had learned about the legal right to compensation 
for land through a radio program. The farmers thus tried to apply different 
discursive means to keep negotiations open and shape the outcomes of the 
process even after the formal decisions about final compensation had been 
made. At the same time, the authorities saw the last payments as closure 
to the lengthy and painful process. This was similar to the social dynamics 
of the process that started in the 1990s of establishing and negotiating the 
compensation levels in the case of the Amani Nature Reserve (Vihemäki 2009). 
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Equity and legitimacy of compensation 
The consequence of the limitations of the villagers influence on the 
displacement and compensation process – access to information, bureaucratic 
and delayed procedures, and the unclear locus of power and responsibility to 
deliver compensation – was a widespread perception that the compensation 
for lost land access was neither fair nor legitimate.   
Discontent with the amounts of compensation had already been expressed 
in 2005, when parts of the pending compensation were paid. Although 
according to the RAP the calculations of the amounts of compensation per 
plant were based on data provided by farmers and buyers, farmers rejected 
the values assigned to their crops (URT 2006:29). Many still took the money 
offered. In 2008, after the final compensation payments, farmers repeatedly 
stated that the sums received were smaller than they had expected, based 
on the number and types of plants each farmer recalled having had, and 
the level of compensation per type of plant according to the RAP (copies 
of which the hamlet leaders had, and the contents of which had been 
discussed among the villagers). The farmers also claimed that they had not 
received prior information on the amounts of individual payments, so that 
the amount came as a surprise when the cheque was collected; or that 
they had not been informed about the exact way each individual payment 
had been calculated. In the survey of 2008, the most salient response to 
what were seen as the problems of the Derema process was “insufficient 
compensation”. The dissatisfaction of the farmers affected with the final 
compensation is likely to have been a combination of two factors: high 
expectations raised by the initial boundary compensation, and incomplete 
knowledge and understanding of the payment calculation method, which 
had changed during the delays in the process. 
The single measure taken to study the customary ownership of the 
farm plots in Derema and to identify the holders of the rights to land and 
eligibility for compensation was the crop valuation exercise, in which the 
people who turned up at the farms on valuation days were recorded as the 
“owners”. This method was inadequate to capture the complex patterns of 
local land ownership vis-à-vis land dependency, and effectively blocked 
women from both the previously accessed farmland, and compensation for 
lost access. After the final compensation payments in 2008, women’s worries 
over the compensation process appeared to have been justified. Whereas 
95% of male survey respondents in 2008 had received compensation for the 
land they lost in the Derema corridor, 73% of the women had not. Women 
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were sidelined in the registration for compensation; only about 5-10% of the 
names on the compensation lists were female (URT 2006:19). Women also 
had reduced access to compensation for a jointly owned farm.
Although most men and women affected stated that the compensation 
money was intended for the entire household regardless of who signed up 
for compensation, women usually had no knowledge about the amount 
and timing of the payments, which in turn reduced their control over how 
the money was used. If the husband returned from the cheque collection 
trip to town with a gift such as bread or a kanga (traditional textile worn 
by women) and the money was nowhere to be seen, “you could just accept 
that” (group discussion, women, Antakae village, April 2008). They would 
normally be given their share for petty household daily consumption with 
no knowledge of the whole sum received. This was seen as a significantly 
worse arrangement than having access to the family farm where cardamom 
could be harvested and sold when financial needs arose, for example, at the 
time of school fee payments. But even with less knowledge of the amounts, 
the women concurred with the men in that the compensation was less than 
expected, making it difficult to be able to carry on with normal life or make 
investments to improve their livelihoods. 
  It is possible that the compensation method not only excluded some 
holders of land rights from compensation but also allowed other actors 
to access it illicitly. It had been observed that new seedlings were being 
planted in the Corridor as the 2002 crop valuation exercise progressed (URT 
2006). In initial discussions, villagers explained that upon learning about 
the Corridor, young farmers had rushed to plant more seedlings in the area 
where they held farms but were not actively cultivating because many of 
them were still in school. From the conservation implementers’ point of 
view, farmers were attracted by the prospects of a “cash bonanza” (URT 
2006:9). 
As the rapport of the authors with the villagers developed, more 
explanations were offered. It was claimed that the area had been invaded by 
swarms of new-comers from the Bulwa tea plantation and business people 
from nearby towns as the news of compensation spread. The tricks used 
to register for compensation included buying bush land from locals and 
quickly planting seedlings, or simply posing on someone else’s farm so that 
the same farms were valued repeatedly with different ‘owners’ by different 
valuation teams. Even corruption involving the valuation officials was hinted 
at. Whereas it is impossible at this point to verify the type and extent of 
any fraud that occurred, some is likely to have taken place considering the 
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observed over two-fold increase in the number of farms during the valuation 
exercise from what had been originally estimated. Farmers later saw the lower 
final compensation rates as being due to the categorisation of their plants 
according to size and maturity, with seedlings entitling them to a very small 
payment, as a direct consequence of the increased number of ‘farmers’. “We 
were told not to invite guests, but some still called their relatives. We ruined 
it for ourselves” (key informant, Makanya village, September 2009). Some 
villagers stated that they had had no means of controlling the outsiders, 
offering a more victimised view of their position in the whole event (group 
discussion, men, Makanya, October 2009).                
Immediately after the final payments in 2008, many of the farmers 
affected were reluctant to acquire alternative farmland in the lowlands 
surrounding the mountains. Some openly questioned the legitimacy of the 
plan to distribute uniform 3-acre plots to all the farmers affected, regardless 
of the size of their area previously accessed in the Corridor (affected 
farmers’ meeting, September 2008). At the time, many were still harvesting 
– although not maintaining – their farms in the Corridor, and living off the 
cash compensation. But by late 2009, the Corridor was considered officially 
protected, and people stated they were not entering the forest any more. 
Compensation money was to many but a distant memory, especially to those 
who had received small sums and used it on daily consumption. Receiving 
land in the lowlands had become the new pressing issue, although there 
were also complaints that there was no money left for the improvement 
of new farms, due to the delay in land allocation. Resentment towards the 
authorities, who were perceived as “having cheated again” in the land issue, 
was increasing. The farmers were also demanding cash compensation for the 
lost land itself. They were greatly concerned over the land issue not being 
settled before the end of the WWF-facilitated resettlement project in January 
2010. The alternative income generating activities planned in the RAP for the 
poorest, most affected farmers had also not been facilitated yet. The despair 
of the RAP project coordinator over the slow progress in the bureaucratic 
procedures of re-allocating former sisal estate land to the Derema farmers 
(personal communication, September 2009) echoed the pleas for assistance 
by the out-going EUCAMP officers in 2002.  
76 F O R E S T  C O N S E R V A T I O N  A N D  H U M A N  D I S P L A C E M E N T
Conclusions
In spite of the efforts of the Corridor planners and implementers to mitigate 
negative social impacts and legitimise the process, many of the Derema 
farmers found that they had lost more than they had gained in the end. 
Some of the common conclusions on the negative social consequences of 
development related displacement found in case studies in the 1980s and 
1990s (e.g. Cernea 1993) resonate with this case. Poor preparation leads 
to delays, increased costs and lost benefits, which negatively affect the 
displaced and undermine development objectives. Particularly difficult cases 
may lead to an unwelcome political backlash or unintentional environmental 
degradation (Partridge 1993, Cernea 2008). 
As of a way improving the equitability and social acceptability of 
outcomes, Cernea (1993) has called for going beyond individual studies 
and formulating decisive policies to prevent the same mistakes from being 
repeated time and again in displacement and resettlement processes. 
Recommendations based on previous studies, such as the adoption of a 
broader concept of displacement which would include restriction of access 
to production resources, were incorporated into the World Bank Operational 
Policy 4.12 on resettlement. This World Bank Policy 4.12 was also applied in 
the later stages of the Derema process. Nevertheless, it appears evident that 
a progressive policy alone is not enough to ensure equitable and legitimate 
outcomes. In the Derema case, some of the departures from the World Bank 
policy were obviously due to its late implementation, which did not permit 
a revision of the conservation approach. Furthermore, the means and scope 
of compensation, i.e., monetary restitution of investments without adequate 
supportive measures, remained the same until the end. The intention to 
address the situation of the poorest and most affected was undermined by a 
limiting political environment in which the time for implementing livelihood 
support measures as a part of the resettlement strategy was consumed by 
the bureaucratic constraints of land allocation. 
More focused efforts to define rights-holders to land and compensation at 
the beginning or at least during the formulation of RAP, could have helped 
to mitigate the negative social effects experienced by some groups. The 
displacement process accelerated social differentiation, since actors who 
had few initial resources or means of defending their interests, such as 
women, had very limited access to compensation while some outsiders 
allegedly benefited. Successful cases of resettlement underline the 
importance of thorough social research at the first stages of an intervention 
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involving displacement (cf. Partridge 1993). Research alone is not sufficient, 
however; the results must be effectively incorporated into the planning 
and implementation of the intervention. Why the findings of the SIA and 
especially the concerns of the women, which were documented as fears 
in 2000 and as actual facts in 2008 and 2009, were not better taken into 
account, remains subject to speculation.     
At the same time, it should be noted that the people affected were not 
merely passive victims in the process, although the means and resources 
available to local actors to defend their interests varied across different 
groups. The consultations with the local people during the planning of the 
Derema Corridor, even though limited in scope and inclusiveness, probably 
served to give some of the farmers more confidence and opportunities 
to defend their interests, and later to actively try to work through their 
representatives and networks to influence the conditions and outcomes of 
the establishment of the Corridor. This political mobilisation was one of the 
unforeseen consequences of the process.
Access to information appears to have been a key factor shaping the agency 
and strategies of the actors involved. Most of the time, the villagers had to 
base their actions on very limited or incorrect information; the conservation 
implementers probably faced similar constraints. As the affected farmers’ 
understanding of the process grew, and their knowledge and perceptions of 
their rights changed, so did their discourse and arguments. The realisation that 
the lost land itself had not been compensated for served as an entry point for 
keeping the process ‘open’ from their point of view, with renewed demands 
for additional compensation, whereas the authorities already considered the 
case closed. This is very illustrative of how actors often actively employ 
different interpretations of concepts and ideas in their attempt to influence 
and enact processes (cf. Freeman et al. 2008; Sikor and Lund 2009).
New conservation corridors are still being planned for the East Usambara 
Mountains, but since the start of the Derema process ten years ago there has 
been a big push towards more extensive local participation and devolved 
forest rights to the communities. Participatory Forest Management (PFM) is 
now actively promoted in all parts of the East Usambara mountains, including 
Finnish support for the East Usambara Forest Landscape Restoration Project 
(http://www.tfcg.org/eusambara.html). Extensive research on the effects of 
PFM on local agency and livelihoods has been carried out (e.g. Vihemäki 
2009; Rantala, forthcoming). However, there is still an obvious gap in studies 
to determine the capability of government protected areas vs. PFM to attain 
ecological goals in order to draw conclusions as to the most effective, 
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equitable and efficient way of protecting the East Usambara forests and their 
multiple values. Elsewhere, research has tended to conclude that PFM is at 
least as effective, or even more effective, as a means of doing so compared 
to protected areas (e.g. Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Nelson and Chomitz 
2009). Conservation decision-makers and implementers should nevertheless 
be wary of relying in forest management on one ‘policy panacea’, such 
as PFM or protected areas, which may come up short when confronted 
with the realities of particular cases (Ostrom et al. 2007; Berkes 2007). The 
Derema case stands out as a staggering example of the unpredictability 
of the outcomes of social change processes in complex socio-ecological 
realities. 
Conservation and development nearly always involve trade-offs, but 
those trade-offs should be based on informed decisions (Sunderland et al. 
2008). If the establishment of protected forest areas is to remain as part 
of the tool box to achieve socially and ecologically optimal conservation 
outcomes, a few basic principles can be learned from the Derema case. Clear 
definitions of local rights to resources, coupled with inclusive mechanisms 
for participation, and backed by the sustained presence and commitment 
of the conservation agencies, are pre-requisites for forest conservation 
interventions involving compensated human displacement which aim to 
avoid negative social consequences for those affected. 
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